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THE PROFESSIONAL ATHLETE'S
RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
LAURA LEE STAPLETON & MATT McMURPHY'
The celebrity in the public eye has two concerns that go be-
yond his or her creative efforts. First, is to guard against intru-
sions to what exists of a private life. Second, is to protect the
value of the celebrity's name, image and other attributes sur-
rounding the person. A celebrity's name and image in our star-
conscious society are valuable commodities. They can be com-
mercially marketed and reap substantial rewards if done with
expertise and intelligence. The celebrity's concern is that
others, without authorization, will attempt to exploit their
2name or image.
I. GENTLEMEN... START YOUR ENGINES: INTRODUCTION
America is a land absolutely fascinated with professional sports. All
one need do is turn on the television and surf through the channels to
see that, as David Letterman would say, we have a sports "jones." There
are many networks that carry all sports all the time, including: CNNSI,
ESPN, ESPN2, ESPNClassic, Fox Sports News, and the Golf Channel.
Professional athletes are our heroes and villains. In many ways, we live
vicariously through them, feeling both the thrill of victory and the agony
of defeat, while glued to our television sets in our living rooms. We iden-
tify with them. Our infatuation with our favorite sports heroes is so
strong that many advertisers pay professional athletes millions of dollars
in order to entice more people to buy their products.
For many professional athletes, the amount of money they can make
from licensing the use of their name or image is astronomical. In fact,
for such athletes as Michael Jordan, Shaquille O'Neal, Tiger Woods, Ar-
nold Palmer, Ken Griffey, Jr., Andre Agassi, Greg Norman, and Jeff
Gordon, the money they can make from endorsements now rivals or ex-
ceeds the money they are paid for competing in their sport. Therefore, it
is no wonder that professional athletes and their agents have become
1. Ms. Stapleton is a partner at Jackson Walker, L.L.P. in Austin, Texas. Mr. McMurphy
is an associate in the Dallas office of Jackson Walker, L.L.P.
2. MARTIN J. GREENBERG & JAMES T. GRAY, SPORTS LAW PRACncE § 7.10(1), at 685
(2d ed. 1992) (quoting DONALD E. BIEDERMAN Er AL., LAW AND Busn _ss oF TH EN-
TERTAnmmNT INDusTRms 555 (1987)).
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extremely dedicated to the concept of protecting the commercial viabil-
ity of their name and image. Marcia Chambers of the New York Times
notes, "[I]n the 1990's many entertainment and sports stars, guided by
agents and law firms, have demanded control of their names and images.
They or their agents maintain that in an age of rampant commercialism
they must hold onto the hottest property they know: themselves."'3
One of the driving factors behind an athlete's ability to profit off of
the commercial value of his name and likeness is the relatively recent
development of the right of publicity. Athletes vigorously defend their
right to be paid for the use of their name, and the right of publicity is one
of their greatest weapons.
The value of an athlete's name and image has become so significant
that he/she will go to great lengths to protect it. For example, ETW
Corporation was created to control the marketing of Tiger Woods' im-
age.4 Since 1997, ETW has sued six companies that it alleges have inter-
fered with Woods's right of publicity.5 On April 15, 1998, Tiger Woods
received a "substantial monetary settlement" and a permanent injunc-
tion barring the Franklin Mint's use of his likeness.6 This settlement was
achieved due to the efforts of ETW Corp., which filed suit against the
Franklin Mint for using Woods' image on one of its commemorative
coins.7 In June 1998, ETW Corp. was at it again, this time filing suit
against an artist who painted pictures of Tiger Woods' victory at the
Masters in 1997, making prints of the paintings and selling 879 of them
without getting Woods' consent.8
Other professional athletes have used this tool to attempt to protect
their interests as well. Notable examples include Kareem Abdul-Jabbar,
Joe Montana, Arnold Palmer, and Muhammad Ali. But what is the right
of publicity and what interests does it protect?
II. X's AND O's: Tim NATURE AND HISTORY OF THE
RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
"The right of publicity is the inherent right of every human being to
control the commercial use of his or her identity."9 "This means that it is
3. Marcia Chambers, Lawsuit Pits Artists' Rights vs. Athletes, N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1999.
4. See id.
5. See id,
6. News Briefs, Golfweek, April 25, 1998.
7. See id.
8. Reggie Rivers, Selling of Woods' Likeness by Artist Goes Out of Bounds, DENY.
ROCKY MTN. NEws, Feb. 28, 1999 at 4C.
9. 4 J. THoMAs McCARTHY, McCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS & UNFAM COMPErlON
§ 28:1, at 28-3 (1996).
[Vol. 10:23
RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
illegal under the right of publicity to use, without a license, the identity
of a real person to attract attention to an advertisement or product."'"
One commentator has characterized the right of publicity in the fol-
lowing manner: "The right of publicity protects athletes' and celebrities'
marketable identities from commercial misappropriation by recognizing
their right to control and profit from the use of their names and nick-
names, likenesses, portraits, performances (under certain circum-
stances), biographical facts, symbolic representations, or anything else
that evokes this marketable identity."" Under this description, "any
trait that uniquely identifies celebrities or athletes implicates their mar-
ketable identities"' 2 and should therefore be protected.
The elements of a violation of the right of publicity are relatively
straightforward. In order to make out a prima facie case for a violation
of the right of publicity, the complaining party must prove the following
elements:
1. Validity. Plaintiff owns an enforceable right in the identity of a
human being.
2. Infringement.
a. Defendant, without permission, has used some aspect of
identity or persona in such a way that plaintiff is identifiable
from defendant's use.
b. Defendant's use is likely to cause damage to the commer-
cial value of that persona."
These elements will be discussed in far greater detail later in this article.
Before doing an in depth analysis of the right of publicity, it is important
to have some basic understanding of what it encompasses.
The right of publicity, like any other right, has its limitations. As
Professor McCarthy notes:
It can give every person the right either to prevent or to permit
for a fee, the use of his or her identity in an advertisement to help
sell someone's product. But the right of publicity cannot be used
to prevent someone's name or picture in news reporting. It can-
not be used to prevent the use of identity in an unauthorized bi-
ography. It cannot prevent use of identity in an entertainment
10. J. Thomas McCarthy, The Human Persona as Commercial Property: The Right of Pub-
licity, 19 CoLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTs 129, 130 (1995).
11. Pamela Edwards, What's the Score?: Does the Right of Publicity Protect Professional
Sports Leagues?, ALB. L. REv., 579, 581 (1998) (citations omitted).
12. Id.
13. McCART-Y, supra note 9, § 28:7, at 28-10.
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parody or satire, such as that of Rich Little or Saturday Night
Live.14
In order to better understand the strengths and weaknesses of the right
of publicity as a tool for protecting the commercial value of the profes-
sional athlete's identity, one needs to understand where the right of pub-
licity comes from.
A. The Checkered Past of the Right of Publicity: Privacy's Stepchild
and Property's Adopted Son
The right of publicity was born out of the right of privacy, and later
developed into a property right of sorts. However, the fact that it was
originally considered part of the right of privacy has confused many
courts over the years, and in turn has flummoxed many commentators
and attorneys. Understanding the course of development of the right of
publicity is essential to a proper understanding of the nature of the right.
In 1890, Samuel D. Warren and Louis Brandeis wrote an article in
the Harvard Law Review titled "The Right to Privacy," 15 which sug-
gested that "the common law creates a 'common zone' in each person's
life that is immune from the prying of neighbors, the press and the pub-
lic."' 16 The article suggested that the law should protect people's feelings
from public intrusion, and not just protect individuals from physical
harm. 7 One commentator has noted that Warren and Brandeis viewed
the right of privacy "as preventing truthful but intrusive and embarrass-
ing disclosures by the press,"' 8 separate from the protections that al-
ready existed for false intrusions.
"Cases early in the twentieth century concerned a variation on the
theme of the 1890 Warren and Brandeis article: the unpermitted use of a
person's name or picture in advertising." 9 A split of authority quickly
developed regarding the applicability of the right of privacy in such
cases.20 The cases that did grant redress for the unauthorized use of a
person's name or picture in advertising did so based on traditional tort
14. McCarthy, supra note 10, at 130-131 (citations omitted).
15. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HAgv. L. REv. 193
(1890).
16. Martin P. Hoffman, Trademarks, Copyrights, and Unfair competition for the General
Practitioner and the Corporate Counse" The Rights of Publicity and Privacy, SC68 A.L.I.-
A.B.A. 217, 219 (1998).
17. See id.
18. McCAR=m, supra note 9, § 28:3, at 28-4.
19. Id.
20. See id.
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law concepts such as personal injury to dignity or state of mind.21 In
such cases, damages were typically measured by amount of mental dis-
tress. 2 Recovery in these cases was based on the concept that when a
person's photograph is used for purposes of selling a product against his
consent, it affronts his humanity, and damages his dignity.' Granting
relief based on these grounds, the courts were still focusing on Warren's
and Brandeis' concept of the "right to be left alone."24 However, when-
ever high profile individuals sought redress for unauthorized use of their
picture in advertising, courts were less willing to grant damages. The
rationale for the courts' refusal to apply the right of privacy to celebrity
figures in these situations was that celebrities should not be heard to
complain about being thrust into the limelight when they have become
celebrities precisely because they have sought such attention and prof-
ited from it.25
A 1941 Fifth Circuit case, O'Brien v. Pabst Sales26 is a good example
of a court's reluctance to apply the protections embodied in the right of
privacy to professional athletes. Davey O'Brien was an All-American
quarterback at Texas Christian University (TCU) who went on to play
for the Philadelphia Eagles. He was also a member of the Allied Youth
of America, which championed young people avoiding alcohol. Pabst
obtained permission from TCU's publicity department to use O'Brien's
picture in its annual football calendar. A picture of O'Brien preparing
to throw the ball was displayed prominently at the top of the calendar,
right next to a glass and bottle of Pabst Blue Ribbon beer. O'Brien sued
Pabst for invasion of privacy based on the claim that he had not given
Pabst permission to use his picture in its calendar and that Pabst's place-
ment of his picture next to the glass of beer "embarrassed and humili-
ated" him.27 The court dismissed his claims based on the finding that the
calendar did not contain an explicit endorsement by O'Brien of Pabst
21. See id.
22. See id
23. See id. § 28:3, at 28-4 to 28-5.
24. lId § 28:3, at 28-5.
25. See PAuL C. WEmER & GARY R. ROBERTS, SPORTS AND TiE LAW 422 (2d ed. 1998)
("There were serious doubts about whether this personal protection against the psychological
injury (hurt feelings) from having such intrusion upon their lives extended to athletes (or
entertainers) who had actively sought to make themselves into celebrated public figures.") Id.;
see also McCARTHY, supra note 9, § 28:4, at 28-5 ("[W]hen a plaintiff whose identity was
already well known sued under [a right of privacy theory], judges were unable to see how
there could be 'indignity' or 'mental distress' to a plaintiff whose identity was already in wide-
spread circulation in the news media.")
26. 124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1941).
27. See id. at 169.
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beer and that "the publicity he got was only that which he had been
constantly seeking and receiving" throughout his career as a football
player.' As has been noted, cases like O'Brien resulted in the inability
of some of America's most celebrated athletes - including Red Grange,
Joe DiMaggio, Joe Louis, Bill Tilden, and even Babe Ruth himself - to
take advantage of a right of publicity during their careers.29
The woeful inability of the right of privacy to protect the ability of
individuals to determine the use of their own name and likeness in ad-
vertising, due to conservative judicial interpretation, laid the foundation
for a new approach to questions of commercial appropriation. As Pro-
fessor McCarthy notes:
Rights and remedies cast in the mental distress mode were not
adequate when the real grievance was "uncompensated, rather
than unwelcomed, publicity." Locked into the incantation of a
right to be left alone, privacy law seemed unable to accommodate
the view that human identity constituted an intellectual property
right with commercial value measured by supply and demand in
the marketplace of advertising. The situation was ripe for a break
in traditional thinking.30
That break in traditional thinking would come a little more than a dec-
ade after the O'Brien decision.
In 1953, in the case of Haelan Lab. v. Topps Chewing Gum,3 1 Judge
Jerome Frank was the first to introduce the phrase "right of publicity."
Haelan entered into a contract with a baseball player for the exclusive
right to use his photograph in connection with the sale of its gum packs,
which included baseball cards. Topps knew of the agreement, but con-
vinced the ballplayer to give Topps a similar right to the use of his photo-
graph for purposes of selling its gum. Haelan brought an action for
inducement to breach contract against Topps 2
Topps argued that the contract entered into between Haelan and the
player amounted to nothing more than a release of liability under New
York law, because in New York "a man [had] no legal interest in the
publication of his picture other than his right of privacy, i.e., a personal
and non-assignable right not to have his feelings hurt by such a publica-
tion. 3a3 Topps' argument essentially attempted to take advantage of the
28. Id. at 170.
29. See WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 25, at 423.
30. McCAnr=, supra note 9, § 28:4, at 28-5.
31. 202 F.2d 866 (2nd Cir. 1953).
32. See id. at 866-868.
33. Id. at 868.
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limitations of the right of privacy in New York to gain access to ballp-
layers with whom its competitor had already contracted. The argument
was essentially that because the New York right of privacy was personal
in nature, it could not be assigned. Since the contracts with the ballp-
layers had not vested any property rights in Haelan, it had no action
against Topps. 4
Judge Frank, writing for the majority in a divided decision, rejected
Topps' position. He held that a common law assignable right of publicity
did exist in addition to the statutory right of privacy in New York. In an
opinion worth quoting, Judge Frank held:
[I]n addition to and independent of that right of privacy (which in
New York derives from statute), a man has a right in the publicity
value of his photograph, i.e., the right to grant the exclusive privi-
lege of publishing his picture, and that such a grant may validly be
made 'in gross,' i.e., without an accompanying transfer of a busi-
ness or of anything else. Whether it be labelled [sic] a 'property'
right is immaterial; for here, as often elsewhere, the tag 'property'
simply symbolizes the fact that courts enforce a claim which has
pecuniary worth.
This right might be called a 'right of publicity.' For it is com-
mon knowledge that many prominent persons (especially actors
and ball-players), far from having their feelings bruised through
public exposure of their likenesses, would feel sorely deprived if
they no longer received money for authorizing advertisements,
popularizing their countenances, displayed in newspapers,
magazines, buses, trains and subways. This right of publicity
would usually yield them no money unless it could be made the
subject of an exclusive grant which barred any other advertiser
from using their pictures.15
Because the court held that the ballplayer did have a property interest in
the use of the player's photograph, the court was able to recognize the
exclusive nature of the agreement between Haelan and the ballplayer.
The court noted that Haelan's interest in the exclusive right to the pho-
tograph was entitled to protection against third parties inducing
34. Id.; see also WEMER & ROBERTS, supra note 25, at 423 ("Topps' defense was that both
sets of contracts amounted to no more than the players giving Haelan a release from liability
for invasion of the privacy right not to have their feelings hurt by unconsented-to publication:
under the governing New York law there was no separate right in the commercial value of
one's name and likeness.")
35. See Haelan Lab., 202 F.2d at 868.
1999]
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW JOURNAL
breach.36 "The judicial ruling in Haelan gave an entirely different prop-
erty twist to the traditional tort slant to privacy doctrine. '37
As vill be seen, the lack of confidence many courts have in whether
the right of publicity is primarily a creature of privacy or property causes
them to have problems applying the doctrine. "As the right of publicity
grew out of the law of privacy, the basic law of privacy itself was being
reorganized. '38 This reorganization led to further confusion as to the
nature of the fledgling right of publicity.
B. Prosser's Four Torts of Privacy: Adding Fuel to the Confusion Fire
Dean William Prosser divided the "amorphous collection of civil
wrongs falling within the category called 'invasion of privacy"' 39 into
four categories:
1. Intrusion upon the plaintiff's physical solitude;
2. Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts;
3. Placing the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye; and the
plaintiff in a false light in the public eye; and
4. Appropriation for commercial benefit of the plaintiff's name
or likeness. 40
These four categories make up Prosser's oft-cited "Four Torts of Pri-
vacy," which courts almost universally folow. 41 The fact that the right of
publicity so closely resembles the misappropriation category, coupled
with the fact that Prosser is such a respected expert on the law, made
many courts reluctant to classify the right of publicity as a property right.
C. Dispelling the Confusion: The Difference Between the "Right of
Privacy" and the "Right of Publicity"
As the right of publicity gained more and more recognition, courts
began to recognize that it was justifiable on separate grounds than those
on which the right to privacy rested.4' In Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son,
Inc., the Supreme Court of Wisconsin distinguished the right of publicity
36. See id. at 867-869.
37. WE LER & ROBERTS, supra note 25, at 423.
38. McCARTHY, supra note 9, § 28:5 at 28-6.
39. Id. § 28:5, at 28-7.
40. Id.
41. See id.
42. It is said that the right of publicity owes its judicial acceptance to Professor Melville
Nimmer, whose seminal article The Right of Publicity called attention to Judge Frank's crea-
tion of this new right. See McCARTHY, supra note 9, § 28:5, at 28-6 (citing Melville Nimmer,
The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CorNrMP. PROBS. 203 (1954)); Kym Carrier, Right of Public-
ity: Cardtoons, L. C. v. Major League Baseball Players Association, 51 OKLA. L. REv. 159, 160-
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from the right of privacy.43 The court indicated that the right of publicity
"protects a property right, not only the right of a person to be let alone
or to live his life in seclusion without mention in the media." 44 As Pro-
fessor McCarthy indicates, the differences between the protections pro-
vided by the right of privacy and those provided by the right of publicity
are "relatively simple and straightforward." 41
Privacy rights are personal rights. Damage is to human dignity.
Injury caused by an invasion of privacy is measured primarily by
"mental distress" and damages causally connected to mental
distress.
On the other hand, the right of publicity is a property right.
Damage is commercial injury to the business value of personal
identity. For example, damages for infringement of the right of
publicity can include the fair market value of the plaintiff's iden-
tity; unjust enrichment and the infringer's profits; and damage to
the business of licensing plaintiff's identity.46
Courts do not always find this distinction as straightforward as Professor
McCarthy does. While the majority of jurisdictions that discuss the right
of publicity do seem to view it as a property right, some still see it as a
subset of the right of privacy based on the fact that it initially developed
in right of privacy cases and that Dean Prosser includes it as the fourth
of his "Four Torts of Privacy."47
D. Gaining Maturity: The Right of Publicity is
Recognized by the Supreme Court
In 1977, the Supreme Court acknowledged that violation of the right
of publicity and invasion of the right of privacy were two distinct torts.48
"[W]hile this new property right (and its tortious invasion) was born in
the 'right of privacy' family, it has gradually matured since 1953 into an
61 (1998) ("The widespread acceptance of the right is largely attributable to an article written
by Melville Nimmer shortly after Haelan.").
43. 280 N.W.2d 129, 130-132 (Wis. 1979).
44. Id. at 134.
45. McCarthy, supra note 10, at 134.
46. IdL
47. One such jurisdiction is New York, which sees the right of publicity as merely an
aspect of the New York statutory right of privacy. See McCarthy, supra note 10, at 134 (citing
Stephano v. News Group Publications, Inc., 474 N.E.2d 580, 584 (N.Y. 1984).)
48. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 571-72 (1977) (noting that
the case the Ohio Supreme Court relied on dealt with a claim under the New York "Right of
Privacy," which it characterized as "an entirely different tort from the 'right of publicity' rec-
ognized by the Ohio Supreme Court.")
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independent legal right with its own distinct characteristics. It is entitled
to its own descriptive and distinctive name: the 'right of publicity."' 4 9
Another indication that the right of publicity has achieved maturity is
its inclusion, for the first time, in the Restatement in 1995.50 To date, the
right of publicity exists in some form in twenty-seven states." It is be-
coming so popular that its development has prompted one judge to note,
"I find no reason to believe that Connecticut would buck the apparent
trend in the law towards recognizing the right of publicity. '52
III. FROM DAVEY O'BREEN TO TIGER WOODs: How THE RIGHT OF
PUBLIcITY APPLIES TO THE PROFESSIONAL ATBLETE
A list of the professional athletes who have sued or whose licensees
or agents have sued for violation of their right of publicity reads like a
transcript of ESPN's SportsCenter: Michael Jordan,53 Joe Montana,54
Elroy "Crazylegs" Hirsch,55 John Riggins,56 Joe Namath,57 Tiger Woods,
Kareem Abdul-Jabbar, 58 Ben Hogan,59 Arnold Palmer,"0 Gary Player,61
Jack Nicklaus, 62 Muhammad Ali,63 "Smokin'"Joe Frazier,'" Albert Et-
49. McCARTHY, supra note 9, §28:7, at 28-9.
50. RE sTATEmENT (TmiRD) OF THE LAw OF UNFAIm CoMPTITIoN, §§ 46-49 (1995).
51. See 1 J. THOMAS McCARTHY, THE RIGHiS OF PuBLicrrY AND PRIVACY, § 6.1[B] at 6-
6 to 6-8, § 6.3[A] at 6-13 to 6-15 (Rev. 1999). McCarthy lists seventeen states as having
adopted a version of the right of publicity under the common law as of March, 1999: Alabama,
California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota,
Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah and Wisconsin. See id. § 6.1[B], at 6-7
to 6-8. He lists ten states as having enacted a statute that encompasses most of the aspects of
the right of publicity: Indiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, Oklahoma,
Rhode Island, Tennessee, Virginia, and Washington. See id. § 6.1[B], at 6-6. The right of pub-
licity exists in New York, but only "within the framework of the New York statute." Id.
§ 6.1[B], at 6-7 (citing Stephano v. News Group Publications, 64 N.Y.2d 174 (N.Y. 1984)).
52. Id. § 6.1[C, at 6-9 (citing Jim Henson Prods. v. John T. Brady & Assocs., 867 F. Supp.
175, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) ("I am of the opinion that the Supreme
Court of Connecticut, like the vast majority of courts that have considered the issue, would
find [the policy goals of a post mortem Right of Publicity] relevant and persuasive.")
53. See MJ Partners Restaurant Ltd. Partnership v. Zadikoff, 10 F. Supp. 2d 922 (N.D. Ill.
1998).
54. See Montana v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc., 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 639 (Cal. Ct. App.
1995); Upper Deck Authenticated, Ltd. v. CPG Direct, 971 F. Supp. 1337 (S.D. Cal. 1997).
55. See Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 280 N.W.2d 129 (Wis. 1979).
56. See Town & Country Properties, Inc. v. Riggins, 457 S.E.2d 356 (Va. 1995).
57. See Namath v. Sports Illustrated, 371 N.Y.S. 10 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975).
58. See Abdul-Jabbar v. General Motors Corp., 75 F.3d 1391 (9th Cir. 1996).
59. See Hogan v. A.S. Barnes & Co., Inc., 114 U.S.P.Q. (Pa. 1957).
60. See Palmer v. Schonhorn Enters., 232 A.2d 458 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1967).
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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tore,6" Mark Messier,66 Mickey Mantle,67 the '69 Mets,68 Hulk Hogan,69
"Rowdy" Roddy Piper,70 Ricky Steamboat,71 Jesse "The Body" Ven-
tura,72 Mario Andretti,73 and Lothar Motschenbacher.74 All have had
their names or likenesses involved to some extent in a dispute over the
right to publicity that made it to the courts. Some won and some lost.
Some, such as Joe Louis, were only mentioned tangentially. Perhaps
more than any other area of the law, professional athletes have played a
defining role in the development of the right of publicity.75
As noted earlier, it was a case involving a professional athlete,76 Da-
vey O'Brien of the Philadelphia Eagles, that drew attention to the fact
that the right of privacy was inadequate for the needs of celebrities and
high profile athletes in protecting their right to control the commercial
dissemination of their own names. Ultimately, it was a case involving
the agreements that a number of baseball players had made with two
baseball card distributors that prompted Judge Frank, in Haelan, to first
coin the phrase "right of publicity. '77 There is no doubt that sports
figures are some of the primary recipients of the benefits of the right of
publicity. Over the years, a number of cases involving professional ath-
letes have helped to mold the state of the right of publicity.
As noted earlier, the elements of a right of publicity claim include:
1. Validity. Plaintiff owns an enforceable right in the identity or
persona of a human being.
2. Infringement.
a. Defendant, without permission, has used some aspect of
identity or persona [of the plaintiff] in such a way that plain-
tiff is identifiable from defendant's use.
64. See Frazier v. South Florida Cruises, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1470 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
65. See Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481 (3rd Cir. 1956).
66. See Hillerich & Bradsby Co. v. Christian Brothers, Inc., 943 F. Supp. 1136 (Minn.
1996).
67. See Upper Deck Authenticated, Ltd. v. CPG Direct, 971 F. Supp. 1337 (S.D. Cal.
1997).
68. See Shamsky v. Garan, Inc., 632 N.Y.S.2d 930 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995).
69. See Titan Sports, Inc. v. Comics World Corp., 690 F. Supp. 1315 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See Ventura v. Titan Sports, Inc., 65 F.3d 725 (8th Cir. 1995).
73. See Andretti v. Rolex Watch U.S.A., Inc., 437 N.E.2d 264 (N.Y. 1982).
74. See Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynods Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974).
75. See WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 25, at 425 ("The sports world not only created
the right of publicity but has also contributed a number of interesting cases regarding the
scope and limits of such a right.")
76. See O'Brien v. Pabst Sales, 124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1941).
77. See Haelan Lab. v. Topps Chewing Gum, 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).
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b. Defendant's use [of plaintiff's identity or persona] is likely
to cause damage to the commercial value of that [identity
or] persona.78
With this framework in mind, this paper will now attempt to analyze the
right of publicity from the unique perspective of the professional athlete.
A. Validity or Standing to Sue
In order to bring a valid claim for infringement of the right of public-
ity, the plaintiff must first meet the "validity" element. However, it is
thought that the validity of the right asserted will not usually be a mate-
rial issue in right of publicity cases.79 The argument is that as long as the
plaintiff asserts a right of identity in a human being, the existence of the
right will not be an issue unless the applicable state law does not recog-
nize commercial rights in human identity.80
The validity element is connected very closely to the concept of
"standing to sue." In the context of the right of publicity, "enforceable
right" means that either the plaintiff's own identity is at issue or that
plaintiff is an assignee or exclusive licensee of someone else's Right of
Publicity.81 Therefore, an athlete or his agent will not have standing to
sue unless his own identity is at issue or he has been assigned or licensed
the right to use the identity or persona at issue. 2
In Upper Deck Authenticated, Ltd. v. CPG Direct,83 a sports
memorabilia dealer brought an action against its competitor. The court
held that Upper Deck lacked standing to assert a claim for misappropri-
ation of the rights of publicity (a California common law claim) of Joe
Montana and Mickey Mantle. The court based its decision on the fact
that Upper Deck had not received an exclusive license to the publicity
rights in question, noting that a non-exclusive licensee cannot assert a
78, MCCARTHY, supra note 51, § 3.1[B], at 3-3.
79. See id. § 3.1[C], at 3-4.
80. See id. (noting that validity will be an issue if the right of publicity is claimed in some-
thing other than a human being, such as a corporation, partnership, institution or animal). But
see Edwards, supra note 11 (arguing that the National Basketball Association should be able
to assert a right of publicity, and further asserting that it probably can assert a right of public-
ity in states with statutes that do not explicitly prohibit entities from making such claims).
81. See McCARTHY, supra note 51, § 3.1[B]-[C], at 3-3 to 3-4.
82, Even when the plaintiff has been assigned or licensed the right of publicity in ques-
tion, standing to sue may be an issue. McCarthy notes: "An exclusive licensee of a Right of
Publicity has standing to sue for infringement of the rights which it owns. Defendant may
challenge "standing" in two senses: that plaintiff does not in fact hold any exclusive license; or
that while plaintiff is a valid exclusive licensee, defendant's use does not infringe upon any
rights which the licensee-plaintiff possesses." McCARmY, supra note 51, § 3.1[C], at 3-4.
83. 971 F. Supp. 1337 (S.D. Cal. 1997).
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claim for misappropriation of the right of publicity, especially where the
person on whose behalf the claim is brought objects to the suit.
In MJ & Partners Restaurant Ltd. Partnership v. Zadikoff,84 standing
to bring a claim for invasion of the right of publicity was also at issue. In
this case, Michael Jordan had granted an exclusive license to the use, in
the restaurant business, of his name and likeness in the Chicago area to
a restaurant company. Subsequently, Jordan allegedly entered into a
tacit agreement with the C.E.O. of the licensee to develop a rival restau-
rant which would also be allowed to use different facets of his persona.
The rival restaurant would allegedly have had a humidor with Jordan's
name on it displayed prominently in the front area of the restaurant,
served "North Carolina" style food in honor of Jordan's home state, and
prominently displayed Jordan automobiles with vanity license plates in
front of the restaurant whenever Jordan was on the premises. The de-
fendant argued that the plaintiff did not have standing to sue for viola-
tion of Jordan's right of publicity because in Illinois, the tort of common
law misappropriation (the equivalent of Prosser's fourth tort of privacy,
and essentially the same as the right of publicity in Illinois) is a deriva-
tive of the right of privacy, and can therefore only be asserted by the
person whose privacy is invaded.85 The court found that, unlike the
other privacy torts, misappropriation protects pecuniary and proprietary
interests while the right of privacy protects emotional interests.8 6 The
court then noted, "Since the tort of misappropriation is premised on a
person's economic interest in publicity rights, the range of plaintiffs who
have standing to make a misappropriation claim expands to the extent
that such publicity rights are assignable."'  The court held that Illinois
courts would "side with the great weight of authority and hold that a
licensee of a celebrity's name may state a cause of action for misappro-
priation of the right to publicity." 8 It is not clear whether the court
would have come to the same conclusion if the license in question had
not been exclusive - one can see why it would not.
B. Identification for Purposes of Infringement
The second element that must be violated in a right of publicity case
is that of infringement. The test for this element is "identifiability." For
84. 10 F. Supp.2d 922 (N.D. IlM. 1998).
85. See id. at 930.
86. See id.
87. Id.
88. Id at 931.
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this element to be satisfied, the defendant must use some aspect of the
plaintiff's identity or persona in such a way that the plaintiff is identifi-
able. Statutory versions of the right of publicity, including those that
derive a right of publicity from a statute based on the right of privacy,
such as New York, generally will spell out which aspects of the persona
are protected.
It is important to emphasize that the test for infringement is iden-
tifiability, and not confusion as to endorsement by the person. Decep-
tion and false endorsement are not needed for a violation of the right of
publicity.89 Professor McCarthy notes:
Identity can be stolen and used to attract attention to an adver-
tisement or product without giving rise to a valid claim of false
endorsement. The identity of a famous person is used to cut
through the clutter of advertising and to merely draw attention to
the advertisement. It is common in advertising just to use the pic-
ture or name of a celebrity or a person prominent in a certain
field without any hint of endorsement.90
Examples of this type of advertisement include, "Jerry Rice and Utopian
Bell phones - both top receivers in their field"'" and "Troy Aikman
may have won three Super Bowls, but he's never smoked Cowboy ciga-
rettes." These examples demonstrate how the right of publicity may be
violated without any message of endorsement being attached.92 These
hypothetical advertisements would be actionable under the right of pub-
licity, whereas they might not be actionable under the Lanham Act.93
The number of people that need to be able to recognize that the in-
fringing use of identity or persona is that of the plaintiff is not set in
stone. Professor McCarthy has described the proper test of "iden-
tifiability" as one of "unaided identification." 94 By this phrase he means
that courts should ask the question, "[C]an more than a de minimis
number of ordinary viewers identify the plaintiff by looking at ... the
defendant's advertisement?" 95 He observes, "[t]he Wisconsin Supreme
Court has indicated that in a right of publicity case, the fact that the
proof might show that only a few people would reasonably identify
89. See McCarthy, supra note 10, at 135.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See id.
93. See id.; 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
94. McCarthy, supra note 10, at 135.
95. Id.
[Vol. 10:23
RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
plaintiff would 'not vitiate the existence of a cause of action' but would
'affect the quantum of damages."96
In Ali v. Playgirl, Inc.97 Playgirl Magazine included in its February
1978 issue a cartoon of a nude black man seated in the comer of a box-
ing ring, with both hands taped and resting on the ropes. The picture
was captioned "Mystery Man," and the identification of the portrayed
individual was further implied by an accompanying reference to "the
Greatest." Ali claimed that it bore an unmistakable resemblance to him,
and that the picture violated his right of publicity. The court took judi-
cial notice of the fact that Ali had "regularly claimed that appellation for
himself and that his efforts to identify himself in the public mind as 'the
Greatest' [had] been so successful that he [was] regularly identified as
such in the news media."9 The court further commented, "[t]he cheek-
bones, broad nose and widest brown eyes, together with the distinctive
smile and close cropped black hair are recognizable as the features of the
plaintiff, one of the most widely known athletes of our time." 99 The
court noted that in New York, recognition is the proper standard regard-
ing whether there has been a violation of the right of publicity.' 0 Find-
ing a clear resemblance between the cartoon and Ali, the court
concluded that Ali's right of publicity had been violated.
Motschenbacher v. Reynolds Tobacco Co.'0 was another case dis-
cussing the level of recognition necessary to infringe upon the right of
publicity. The infringing representation was not as recognizable as the
picture of All. This case involved Lothar Motschenbacher's appeal of
the district court's decision that he was not recognizable in the advertise-
ment in question. Motschenbacher was a professional race car driver
known to racing fans internationally. His solid red car with a narrow
white pinstripe and white oval surrounding the number eleven was
equally well known to car racing enthusiasts. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.
96. Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Sons, Inc. 280 N.W.2d 129, 137 (1979); see also Negri v.
Schering Corp., 333 F. Supp. 101, 104 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) ("In any event, the number of people
who recognize the photograph in the advertisement as that of [plaintiff], while it may be rele-
vant on the question of damages, is not material on the issue of liability. On that issue the
question is whether the figure is recognizable, not the number of people who recognized it.")
97. 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
98. Id. at 727 (noting that the cover of the February 27, 1978 issue of Time featured a
photograph of Ali, captioned "'The Greatest' is Gone").
99. Id. at 726.
100. See id. at 726 (citing Negri v. Schering Corp., 333 F. Supp. 101, 104 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)
for the proposition that the New York statute in question applies to any representations that
are "recognizable as likenesses of the complaining individual.")
101. 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974).
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produced and televised a commercial which included an altered version
of Motschenbacher's car in the foreground. Rather than an eleven, the
car now had a seventy-one, and the producers of the commercial made it
look as if the car had a spoiler on the back with the word "Winston" on
it. Defendants made no other changes to the car. After concluding that
California courts would afford legal protection to an individual's propri-
etary interest in his own identity, the court turned to the issue of "iden-
tifiability."102 The court of appeals agreed with the district court that
Motschenbacher's likeness itself was unrecognizable.0 3 However, the
court of appeals determined that the district court had erred in its con-
clusion that the driver of the car was not identifiable as Motschenbacher
because it "fail[ed] to attribute proper significance to the distinctive dec-
orations appearing on the car.... [T]hese markings were not only pecu-
liar to the plaintiff's cars but they caused some persons to think the car in
question was plaintiff's and to infer that the person driving the car was
the plaintiff."'" Based on the uniquely distinguishing features that the
court found, it determined that it was an issue for the jury whether Mot-
schenbacher's proprietary interest in his own identity had been
violated. 05
Cases have also held that the "name" protected by the right of pub-
licity extends beyond given names to nicknames. In Hirsch v. S.C. John-
son & Son, Inc.,106 Elroy "Crazylegs" Hirsch, of University of Wisconsin
and Los Angeles Rams football fame, brought a right of publicity action
against a company for its unauthorized use of Hirsch's nickname
"Crazylegs" on its brand of women's shaving cream. 07 In overruling the
lower court's award of summary judgment to the defendant, the Wiscon-
sin Supreme Court decided to recognize the right of publicity. 03 The
court further held that all that is required with regard to identity is that
the name clearly identify the wronged person. 09 Because the court
found that the nickname "Crazylegs" clearly identified Hirsch, the court
102. See id. at 826.
103. See id. at 827.
104. Id. at 827.
105. See id. at 825-826.
106. 280 N.W.2d 129 (Wis. 1979).
107. The court explains that in one game, while playing for the University of Wisconsin in
1942, Hirsch completed a sixty-two yard touchdown run in which he wobbled down the side-
line, looking as if he might step out of bounds at any moment. The court notes that his unique
running style, "which looked something like a whirling eggbeater," caused a sportswriter to
nickname him "Crazylegs." He was known by that moniker from that day forward. Id. at 131.
108. See id.
109. See id. at 137-140.
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found that the lower court erred in granting summary judgment to
defendant.110
In a recent case in California, the court stretched the concept of rec-
ognition to its furthest reach yet."' In White v. Samsung Electronics
America, Inc., Vanna White of "Wheel of Fortune" fame sued Samsung
alleging that Samsung had violated her statutory and common law rights
of publicity under California law." 2 The dispute in this case arose out of
an ad campaign that Samsung ran. Each add was set in the twenty-first
century and conveyed the idea that Samsung products would last until
then. The commercial which led to this action
depicted a robot, dressed in a wig, gown, and jewelry which [had
been] consciously selected to resemble White's hair and dress.
The robot was posed next to a game board which [was] instantly
recognizable as the Wheel of Fortune game show set.... The
caption of the ad read: 'Longest running game show. 2012 A.D." 3
This ad was referred to by Samsung as the "Vanna White" ad, and unlike
the other celebrities depicted in the ad campaign, White did not consent
to the ad and was not paid for the ad.
The court first dismissed White's statutory right of publicity claim,
because Samsung's use of the robot did not rise to the level of a "like-
ness" as contemplated by the California publicity statute.1 4 However,
as the court had done on previous occasions, it held that the common
law right of publicity claim could survive even though the statutory claim
had been dismissed."' The court then held that, unlike the statutory
right which is limited to the appropriation of name or likeness, the com-
mon law right of publicity is based on the "use of any indicia by which
the plaintiff is identifiable."116
The court drew an analogy which is central to the professional ath-
lete's right of publicity, and accordingly should be relayed in full.
Consider a hypothetical advertisement which depicts a mechani-
cal robot with male features, and African-American complexion,
and a bald head. The robot is wearing black hightop Air Jordan
basketball sneakers, and a red basketball uniform with black trim,
baggy shorts, and the number 23 (though not revealing "Bulls" or
110. See id. at 140.
111. See McCarthy, supra note 10, at 136.
112. 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992).
113. Id. at 1396.
114. See id at 1397.
115. See id.; see also Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988); Carson v.
Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983).
116. McCarthy, supra note 10, at 136.
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"Jordan" lettering). The ad depicts the robot dunking a basket-
ball one-handed, stiff-armed, legs extended like open scissors, and
tongue hanging out. Now envision that this ad is run on television
during professional basketball games. Considered individually,
the robot's physical attributes, its dress, and its stance tell us little.
Taken together, they lead to the only conclusion that any sports
viewer who has registered a discernible pulse in the past five
years would reach: the ad is about Michael Jordan. 17
The court concluded that Vanna White is the only one that dresses like
the robot, turns letters, and does the "Wheel of Fortune" game show.
Based on this conclusion, the court held that White had alleged facts
showing that Samsung had appropriated her identity and should accord-
ingly survive the motion for summary judgment." 8
In support of the opinion, McCarthy remarks that "the only appeal of
the Samsung advertisement lies in the viewer's immediate recognition
that this is not just any game show robot, this is a Vanna White robot."119
Since the ad would be worthless without the inclusion of the image of
Vanna White, it seems logical that Samsung should not be able to make
the ad without compensating White.
Related tangentially to the issue of "identifiability" is the issue of
abandonment. While a name may have been identifiable with an indi-
vidual at one time, can it be abandoned so that the individual can no
longer claim a right of publicity if someone else subsequently uses it in a
commercial way? This issue was broached in Abdul-Jabbar v. General
Motors Corp.'20 Kareem Abdul-Jabbar, the former L.A. Lakers super-
star famous for the "sky hook," was named Ferdinand Lewis ("Lew")
Alcindor when he was born. He retained that name throughout his col-
lege career and into the early years of his career in the National Basket-
ball Association. While in college, he converted to Islam and began to
be called "Kareem Abdul-Jabbar" by his friends. In 1971, he chose to
record the new name officially under an Illinois name recordation stat-
ute. After the name change, he played basketball and received endorse-
ments under the name "Kareem Abdul-Jabbar."
The dispute arose due to a GMC television commercial aired during
the 1993 NCAA men's basketball tournament. It asked the question,
"Who holds the record for being voted the most outstanding player of
this tournament?" The answer to the question, as shown on the televi-
117. See White v. Samsung Electronics Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992).
118. See id.
119. McCarthy, supra note 10, at 137.
120. 75 F.3d 1391 (9th Cir. 1996).
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sion screen, was "Lew Alcindor, UCLA, '67, '68, '69." The commercial
then made a comparison between that feat and the fact that the Oldsmo-
bile '88 had made the best buy list more than once. Abdul-Jabbar
brought a state law right of publicity claim against GMC due to the men-
tion of his former name in the commercial. 1
21
The district court found that Abdul-Jabbar had abandoned the name
Lew Alcindor when he recorded his new name in Illinois. 22 Abdul-Jab-
bar argued that abandonment is not a defense to a violation of the right
of publicity because the right of publicity protects not only a celebrity's
"sole right to exploit his identity," but also his "decision not to use his
name or identity for commercial purposes."'" The court, in overturning
the district court's grant of summary judgment to the defendant, held
that it is not possible for a person to lose rights in their own name or
likeness through non-use. 24 It seems worth noting that it does not seem
that Abdul-Jabbar merely did not use his previous name, he actually
changed his name legally. Such action seems like it goes beyond non-
use. If changing one's name is not enough to abandon the old one, then
it is hard to imagine a situation where one could abandon his name.
C. Commercial Value of Identity or Persona
The third element of a violation of the right of publicity requires
plaintiff to prove that defendant used plaintiff's identity or persona in a
way that is likely to cause damage to the commercial value of that iden-
tity or persona. This element was discussed in Gautier v. Pro-Football,
Inc."z The court found that a broadcast of an animal trainer's halftime
show by a sports league, contrary to his contract, did not violate his New
York statutory right of privacy. 126 Although there had been a commer-
cial announcement immediately preceding plaintiff's performance and
immediately following the performance of those who performed after
the plaintiff, the plaintiff's name and picture were in no way connected
with the commercial announcements. The commercial announcements
were presented at usual and appropriate intervals. The court gleaned
that:
[I]t was nothing more than coincidence that one such announce-
ment [commercial], made at the close of the first half, occurred
121. See id at 1393.
122. See id.
123. Id. at 1400.
124. See id at 1396.
125. 107 N.E.2d 485 (N.Y. App. 1952).
126. See iL at 489.
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immediately prior to his act. He was not connected with the
product either by visual, oral or other reference, nor was any is-
sue of fact created by the physical juxtaposition of the single an-
nouncement prior to his performance. 127
The court concluded that his name or picture had not been used for ad-
vertising purposes within the meaning of the New York right of privacy
statute.12
IV. CLEARING THE PUCK OUT OF fM ZONE: DEFENSES TO TiE
RIGHT OF PUBLICrIY CLAIM
There are two main defenses available to the defendant when the
plaintiff asserts a right of publicity claim. The first defense is consent,
and the second is the First Amendment. Parody also arises as a defense,
though it is best described as a subset of the First Amendment defense.
The consent defense is really just an offshoot of the validity element. If
the defendant has the consent of the person whose right of publicity is in
question, then there is no violation of that right of publicity. Discussion
of this issue generally centers around whether the defendant had consent
to take the particular actions in question.
A. Consent Defense
In Sharman v. C. Schmidt & Sons, Inc., the court considered the con-
sent defense. Plaintiff William Sharman played for the Boston Celtics in
the early 1960s.119 He obtained the services of an agent to find employ-
ment for him as a model for advertisements. His agent connected him
with a commercial photographic studio, which took some photographs of
Sharman, including one in which he was bowling. 30 Sharman was paid
one hundred and twenty-five dollars for the use of his likeness in the
campaign.' 3' At the time his photograph was taken, he executed two
releases, which permitted the defendant to use his picture, either as
taken or "distorted in character, or form," for advertising purposes and
gave unrestricted rights to all persons and corporations to use Sharman's
name in conjunction with his picture. 3 The defendant company
purchased the rights to Sharman's picture from the commercial photo-
graphic studio. The defendant later engraved a beer glass and bottle on
127. Id. at 488.
128. See id.
129. 216 F. Supp. 401 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
130. See id. at 403.
131. See id.
132. See id. at 404.
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the advertisement and subsequently used the picture in an advertising
campaign promoting its beer.133
Sharman brought an action based on an invasion of his right of pub-
licity. 34 He maintained that although he did consent to the use of the
bowling picture, the amendment of the picture to include the beer glass
and bottle exceeded the authorization of the release, effectively nullify-
ing his consent. 35 Sharman cited cases holding that altered pictures can
exceed the consent conferred by a release. 36 The court found that it had
been "contemplated by all parties involved that the picture would be
used for a commercial purpose.' 1 37 Since the sale of beer is a commer-
cial purpose, the court rejected Sharman's argument that the form of his
picture exceeded his consent.' 38 The court noted, "[a] sports figure can
complain when his name or likeness is used to advertise a product but he
can recover damages only if he has not consented to such use or the
advertising exceeds the consent granted.' 39 Since the court concluded
that the defendant's use of Sharman's picture did not exceed the param-
eters of his consent, it denied Sharman's claim. 40
Andretti v. Rolex Watch U.S.A., Inc., involved a dispute between the
famous race car driver and the famous watch manufacturer.' 4' Mario
Andretti brought an action against Rolex for allegedly using his name
and picture in advertisements without his consent. 42 Rolex advanced
the defense that it did have Andretti's consent. 43 Before the advertise-
ments in question were published, Andretti accepted a Rolex watch
worth approximately six thousand dollars and sent an autographed pho-
tograph to the president of Rolex with the handwritten inscription, "[T]o
Rene... it's good to be a member of your Rolex Club! All the best,
Mario Andretti.' 44 The lower court had granted summary judgment to
Andretti on the ground that the signed statement on the photograph
could not "fairly be construed as a written consent to the use of [An-
dretti's] name or picture for advertising purposes or for the purposes of
133. See id. at 403.
134. Sharman v. C. Schmidt & Sons, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 401, 402 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
135. See icL at 405.
136. See id.
137. k at 406.
138. See id.
139. Sharman v. C. Schmidt & Sons, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 401, 407 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
140. See id. at 408.
141. 437 N.E.2d 264 (N.Y. 1982).
142. See id. at 264-265.
143. See id. at 265.
144. Id.
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trade."14 The Court of Appeals of New York overturned summary
judgment, stating that factual issues existed "as to what membership in
the Rolex Club entailed, i.e., whether [Andretti] thereby consented to
the use of his name and likeness in Rolex advertisements.' 46 It noted
that parol evidence might be introduced to establish that the writing in
question was intended as the expression of the necessary consent. 47
B. First Amendment Defense
Legal scholars claim that the most difficult defense to deal with in a
right of publicity case is the assertion of the First Amendment . 48 Free-
dom of speech and of the press, as protected by the First Amendment,
can limit the application of the right of publicity. 149 Discussing the limi-
tations posed on the right of publicity by the First Amendment, a New
York court stated:
[W]here the right to publicity is recognized, it does not invest a
prominent person with the right to exploit financially every public
use of name or picture. What is made actionable is the unauthor-
ized use for advertising purposes in connection with the sale of a
commodity. The "right of publicity," therefore, like that of "pri-
vacy"... would be held to have no application where the use of a
name or picture... is in connection with a matter of public inter-
est. That such use is constitutionally protected and must super-
sede any private pecuniary considerations is conceded even by
those who urge more widespread recognition of a distinct right of
publicity.15 0
Courts are forced to conduct a very delicate balancing act in determining
where "newsworthy" ends and "commercial" begins.
One prominent scholar on right of publicity law explains the highly
fact specific analysis as follows:
[I]n general, with a balancing between the property right of the
right of publicity and the policy of free speech, a given unauthor-
ized use of a person's identity will fall within one of two catego-
ries: the challenged use is either "communicative" or
"commercial." A "communicative" use is one in which the policy
of free speech predominates over the right of a person to his iden-
tity, and no infringement of the right of publicity takes place. A
145. Andretti v. Rolex Watch, U.S.A., Inc., 440 N.Y.S.2d 212, 214 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
146. Andretti, 437 N.E.2d at 265.
147. See id.
148. See McCARTY, supra note 51, § 3.1[F], at 3-5.
149. See iL
150. Paulsen v. Personality Posters, Inc., 299 N.Y.S.2d 501, 508 (N.Y. 1968).
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"commercial" use is one in which the right of publicity is in-
fringed because, while there are overtones of ideas being commu-
nicated, the use is primarily commercial. The medium used will
often determine the result. For example, the unpermitted use of a
person's identity on a product such as a coffee mug or a T-shirt
will be "commercial" and require a license. But the unpermitted
use of a person's identity and picture to illustrate a story in a
newspaper, magazine or television news program will be "com-
municative" and immune.' 5 '
With the type of fact specific analysis described above taking place, this
is the area of the right of publicity law in which it is most difficult to
predict the outcome of cases.
In Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., Hugo Zacchini was
a daredevil whose "human cannonball" act involved his being shot out of
a cannon into a waiting net some 200 feet away.'52 The act took approxi-
mately 15 seconds to complete. A reporter covering the county fair
where Zacchini was performing videotaped the entire 15 second act after
Zacchini asked him not to and played it on his television station's 11
o'clock news program that night. The reporter admonished the televi-
sion audience that they really needed to see the act in person to appreci-
ate it. Zacchini brought an action against the television station claiming
that his right of publicity had been violated.'53 A divided Supreme
Court decided in a five to four decision that granting relief to Zacchini
on the state law right of publicity claim would not infringe on the televi-
sion station's First Amendment rights.'54 The United States Supreme
Court noted that Zacchini's right of publicity claim would not prevent
the television station from reporting the newsworthy aspects of
Zacchini's act.'55 However, the court held that when a member of the
media broadcasts a performer's entire act without his consent, the First
and Fourteenth Amendments do not immunize his conduct. 5 6 In a fa-
mous passage, the court explained the rationale for its decision:
The broadcast of a film of [Zacchini's] entire act poses a substan-
tial threat to the economic value of that performance.... [T]his
act is the product of [Zacchini's] own talents and energy, the end
result of much time, effort, and expense. Much of its economic
value lies in the "right of exclusive control over the publicity
151. McCART, supra note 9, § 28:41, at 28-49 to 28-50 (citations omitted).
152. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
153. See id. at 564.
154. See id. at 578.
155. See id.
156. See id. at 578-579.
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given to his performance;" if the public can see the act free on
television, it will be less willing to pay to see it at the fair. The
affect of a public broadcast of the performance is similar to
preventing petitioner from charging an admission fee.... [and]
goes to the heart of petitioner's ability to earn a living as an
entertainer. 157
The opposing principles that collided in this landmark right of publicity
case were both important.
The one side, emphasized by the dissent, is that this case involved
a newscast, worthy of far greater constitutional protection than
commercial marketing. The other side, focused on by the major-
ity, was that this broadcast was not simply an "appropriation of an
entertainer's reputation to enhance the attractiveness of a com-
mercial product, but the appropriation of the very activity by
which the entertainer acquired his reputation in the first
place.",' 58
In Zacchini, the delicate balancing act tipped in favor of the right of
publicity.
However, the First Amendment does not often play second fiddle to
the right of publicity in cases involving "communicative" uses of a per-
sons persona. 159 Professional athletes have encountered this phenome-
non in a number of cases. The first such case was Namath v. Sports
Illustrated, decided in 1975.160 Joe Namath, quarterbacking legend of the
New York Jets, sued Sports Illustrated for invasion of privacy under Civil
Rights Law in New York State court for its publication of a photograph
of him in conjunction with advertisements promoting subscriptions to
the magazine without his consent.' 61 Sports Illustrated ran a number of
articles about the Jets victory in Super Bowl III on January 20, 1969. In a
later promotional push to sell more magazines, Sports Illustrated ran the
famous picture under the captions, "The Man You Love loves Joe
Namath," and "How to get Close to Joe Namath."'16
157. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 575, 576.
158. WE LER & ROBERTS, supra note 25, at 425.
159. For discussion of the term "communicative," see text discussion supra page 30.
160. 371 N.Y.S.2d 10 (N.Y. 1975).
161. See id. at 11. In New York, right of publicity claims have to be brought within the
rubric of §§ 51 and 52 of the New York Civil Rights Laws because a New York Court of
Appeals has ruled that there is neither a common law right of publicity nor a common law
right of privacy in New York. See Stephano v. News Group Publications, Inc., 474 N.E.2d 580
(N.Y. 1984). ("Since the 'right of publicity' is encompassed under the Civil Rights Laws as an
aspect of the right of privacy, which, as noted, is exclusively statutory in this state, the plaintiff
cannot claim an independent common law right of publicity.").
162. Namath, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 13.
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The court admitted that the magazine's republication of Namath's
picture was "in motivation, sheer advertising and solicitation," but con-
cluded that "[t]his alone is not determinative of the question so long as
the law accords an exempt status to incidental advertising."'1 63 Therefore,
the court found that Sports Illustrated's use of Namath's photograph was
"merely incidental advertising of defendants' magazine in which
[Namath] had earlier been properly and fairly depicted" and so was not
a violation of the Civil Rights Law."6
A similar result was reached in Montana v. San Jose Mercury News,
Inc., decided in a California state court in 1995.165 Another superstar
quarterback, champion of four super bowls and in many people's minds
the greatest quarterback of all time, sued the San Jose Mercury News on
common law and statutory commercial misappropriation claims. On
January 22, 1989, Joe Montana led the San Francisco 49ers to a twenty to
sixteen last minute victory over the Cincinnati Bengals in Super Bowl
XXIII. The next day, the Mercury News ran a front page story paying
homage to the accomplishment and depicting four players, including
Montana, celebrating on the field. The very next year, after Montana's
49ers vanquished the Denver Broncos in an even more impressive fifty-
five to ten pounding in Super Bowl XXIV, the Mercury News once again
ran stories celebrating San Francisco's success, accompanied by pictures
of Montana during the game. In 1990, Joe Montana and the 49ers won
yet another Super Bowl, giving them an unparalleled four champion-
ships in the decade prior to 1990. This time, the Mercury News com-
memorated all four victories by issuing a special "Souvenir Section" in
its Sunday, February 4, 1990, edition, which was devoted exclusively to
the 49ers, a "team of destiny." The souvenir section, titled "Trophy
Hunters," carried an artist's rendition of Montana on the front page. 66
Within two weeks, each of the newspaper pages from the "Souvenir Sec-
tion" was reproduced in poster form and made available for sale to the
general public.167
Almost two years after production of the posters was completed,
Montana brought suit against the Mercury News alleging common law
and statutory misappropriation of his name, photograph, and likeness. 68
The court noted that "no cause of action will lie for the 'publication of
163. Id. at 11-12.
164. Id. at 11.
165. 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 639 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
166. See i& at 640.
167. See iUL
168. See id.
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matters in the public interest, which rests on the right of the public to
know and the freedom of the press to tell it"' and that "a matter in the
public interest is not restricted to current events but may extend to the
reproduction of past events." 169 Montana conceded that the articles
themselves were entitled to First Amendment protection.170 However,
he argued that the reproduction of the newspaper pages in poster form
was not entitled to First Amendment protection.
71
The court granted the Mercury News' motion for summary judgment
on two First Amendment grounds.1 72 First, the court found that "Mon-
tana's name and likeness appeared in the posters for precisely the same
reason they appeared on the original newspaper front pages: because
Montana was a major player in contemporaneous newsworthy sports
events."'17 Therefore, the Mercury News had a worthy purpose, other
than merely extracting the commercial value from Montana's face and
name. Second, the court found that a newspaper has a constitutional
right to promote itself by reproducing its news stories.
The cases thus far discussed have dealt with "communicative"
speech. When the right of publicity finds itself opposite to First Amend-
ment rights in "commercial" speech cases, the right of publicity usually
triumphs.1 74 One illustrative case involving a professional athlete is Ab-
dul-Jabbar v. General Motors Corp., discussed earlier for its holding that
a person cannot abandon his name through non-use for purposes of the
right of publicity.' 75 The court in this case also discussed defendant
General Motors' contention that its use of the name Lew Alcindor was
"incidental" and therefore not actionable, citing Namath.176 The court
distinguished Namath and Montana.77 In dismissing General Motors'
position, the court noted that while the basketball record of Lew Al-
cindor may be said to be "newsworthy," it is not automatically privi-
leged. The court held that because General Motors used the information
in the context of an automobile advertisement (a "commercial" use),
169. Id.
170. See Montana v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc., 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 639, 641 (Cal. Ct. App.
1995).
171. See id.
172. See id. at 643.
173. Id. at 641.
174. For discussion of the term "commercial," see text discussion supra II(C).
175. See Abdul-Jabbar v. General Motors Corp., 75 F.3d 1391 (9th Cir. 1996).
176. 371 N.Y.S.2d 10 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975).
177. Montana v. San Jose Mercury News, 40 Cal. Rptr.2d 639 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
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rather than in a sports or news account, the use was privileged under the
First Amendment. 17
C. Parody
A controversial issue currently in the forefront of discussions regard-
ing the right of publicity involves the role that parody should play in the
courts' First Amendment analysis. White v. Samsung Electronics
America, Inc., discussed earlier for its analysis of "identifiability," ex-
plored the extent to which parody should be considered a defense in
right of publicity cases involving commercial speech. 79 The court recog-
nized that the advertisement in question was run for the purpose of sell-
ing Samsung VCRs. In that context, the court remarked, "[t]he ad's
spoof of Vanna White and Wheel of Fortune is subservient and only tan-
gentially related to the ad's primary message: 'buy Samsung VCRs."s 0
Therefore, the court held that Samsung's parody arguments were better
suited to non-commercial parodies, where the First Amendment hurdle
is higher, cautioning, "[t]he difference between a 'parody' and a 'knock-
off' is the difference between fun and profit."''
As demonstrated by the Ninth Circuit's decision in White, the parody
defense may not be very effective when the court classifies the use in
question as "commercial," rather than "communicative." However, it
should be apparent even to the casual observer that the issue of whether
a particular use is "commercial" or "communicative" is not exactly set in
stone. Courts apply a highly fact sensitive analysis, which is subjective in
nature. It stands to reason, then, that when embroiled in a right of pub-
licity suit, defendants will desire to convince the court that for one rea-
son or another, the use they are being sued for is in fact
"communicative," and worthy of the highest level of First Amendment
protection. 82 Fueling this speculation is Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major
178. See Abdul-Jabbar v. General Motors Corp., 75 F.3d 1391, 1401 (9th Cir. 1996).
179. See 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992).
180. Id. at 1401.
181. Id. at 1401 n.3.
182. For many years, some commentators have called for courts to apply a copyright "fair
use" analysis to right of publicity cases for consistency reasons. See Carrier, supra note 42, at
162 (citing Randall T.E. Coyne, Toward a Modified Fair Use Defense in Right of Publicity
Cases, 29 WM. & MARY L. Rnv. 781, 782 (1988); H. Lee Hetherington, Direct Commercial
Exploitation of Identity: A New Age for the Right of Publicity, 17 COLUM.-VIA J.L. & ARTs 1,
28-30 (1992)). In 1994, the United States Supreme Court upheld the use of parody as a valid
defense to "commercial" use in a copyright case, applying the "fair use" doctrine. See Camp-
bell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). If courts begin to apply the Supreme
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League Baseball Players Association,183 in which the court determined
that defendant's use of parody should be subject to the highest level of
protection.
In that case, Cardtoons, L.C. represented to the court that it was
"formed in late 1992 to produce parody trading cards featuring carica-
tures of major league baseball players. Cardtoons contracted with a
political cartoonist, a sports artist, and a sports author and journalist,
who designed a set of 130 cards."'184 The cards lampooned various as-
pects of baseball and its players, including the players' substantial sala-
ries, 85 player vanity,8 6 and the physical characteristics of the players.' 7
When the Major League Baseball Players Association (MLBPA), which
"acts as the assignee of the individual publicity rights of all active play-
ers,"188 discovered Cardtoons plans to distribute the cards in question, it
wrote a cease and desist letter to Cardtoons. In response, Cardtoons
filed suit seeking declaratory judgment that its cards did not violate the
publicity rights of the players or the MLBPA, and that it could distribute
its parody baseball cards without the consent of the MLBPA. 8 9
The court employed a three part test to figure out whether Cardtoons
should be granted the relief it sought: (1) whether the cards infringed
upon MLBPA's right of publicity, (2) whether the cards are protected by
the First Amendment, and (3) a balancing test to determine the relative
importance of the rights at stake if both parties have been determined to
have cognizable rights.190 The court initially noted that all of the ele-
ments of the Oklahoma right of publicity statute in question had been
met, and that the only possibility of relief for Cardtoons was a First
Court's analysis in that case to right of publicity cases, it will not be as harmful to defendants
to have the use in question characterized as "commercial."
183. 95 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 1996).
184. Id. at 962.
185. One card referred to San Francisco Giants outfielder Barry Bonds as "Treasury
Bonds" of "the Gents," noting that he "plays so hard he gives 110 percent, compounded
daily," and "always cashes in on the payoff pitch." Id. at 962-63.
186. One card referred to Ricky Henderson, who played for the Oakland Athletics at the
time, as "Egotisticky Henderson" of the "Pathetics," and described a scene in which he ac-
cepted the "Me-Me Award" at a fan club banquet. See id. at 963.
187. One card referred to the 6'10" Randy Johnson, who then played for the Seattle Ma-
riners, as "Cloud Johnson" of the "Marn-Nerds." See i at 963.
188. Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n., 95 F.3d 959, 963 (10th Cir.
1996).
189. See id. at 964.
190. See id. at 966.
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Amendment defense.191 Therefore, the court moved on to the second
step in its analysis.' 9
The court unexpectedly found that baseball cards "receive full pro-
tection under the First Amendment."' 93 The court referred to baseball
cards as "commentary on an important social institution"' 9 4 and "an ed-
ucation in baseball.' 95 It further held that the cards were not subject to
a lesser degree of protection based on the fact that they were humor-
ous.
1 9 6 To the contrary, the court noted, "[s]peech that entertains, like
speech that informs, is protected by the First Amendment because '[t]he
line between the informing and the entertaining is too elusive for the
protection of that basic right.' 1 97 The court specifically addressed the
issue of commercial speech, noting that it is afforded a lower level of
First Amendment protection, but finding that Cardtoons' trading cards
did not fall within the commercial speech category because "they do not
merely advertise another unrelated product."' 98
Since the court found that the MLBPA's right of publicity had been
violated, and that Cardtoons' free speech had been implicated, it pro-
ceeded to the third step of its analysis which involved weighing the two
rights against each other to determine which right should prevail.' 99 The
court found that Cardtoons could not have achieved its purpose through
less invasive means.
Cardtoons' expression requires use of player identities because, in
addition to parodying the institution of baseball, the cards also
lampoon individual players. Further, Cardtoons' use of the trad-
ing card format is an essential component of the parody because
191. See id. at 968.
192. See id. at 968.
193. Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n., 95 F.3d 959, 969 (10th Cir.
1996). It has been said that the court took this unexpected step in its decision in an attempt to
avoid the "commercial use" problem. See Carrier, supra note 37, at 170 (raising the possibility
that by avoiding the "commercial use" problem, the court may have "opened the door" for
non-parodic baseball cards to distribute cards without seeking a licensing agreement, because
if baseball cards are "education[s] in baseball," licenses may no longer be required).
194. Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 969 ("The cards provide social commentary on public figures,
major league baseball players, who are involved in a significant commercial enterprise, major
league baseball [sic]. While not core political speech (the cards do not, for example, adopt a
position on the Ken Griffey, Jr., for President campaign), this type of commentary is an impor-
tant social institution.").
195. Id.
196. See id.
197. Id. (citing Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948)).
198. Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n., 95 F.3d 959, 970 (10th Cir.
1996).
199. See id. at 970.
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baseball cards have traditionally been used to celebrate baseball
players and their accomplishments. 200
The court concluded that the First Amendment right of Cardtoons
trumped the right of publicity because otherwise, Cardtoons would have
to get the MLBPA's consent to distribute the cards.20 ' The court
thought such consent was unlikely, effectively preventing the cards from
entering the public discourse.202 The court decided that such censorship
of player criticism was "clearly undesirable," and accordingly granted
Cardtoons declaratory judgment. 3 This decision dealt a significant
blow to the publicity rights of professional athletes with respect to trad-
ing cards.2" There is the possibility that the decision may be even more
significant, allowing all trading card companies to stop paying licensing
fees to players and players associations. 0 5
Since the majority in Cardtoons cited the dissent in White, it seems
that this is not the end of the parody argument. Furthermore, the courts
have yet to address in a meaningful way the situation where commercial
speech is implicated and a parody defense is asserted. Commentators
who hoped that the Tenth Circuit would carve out a parody defense for
commercial speech are probably disappointed by the fact that the court
did not address that issue.20 6 Commercial speech is not afforded the
same level of protection as fully protected speech, but courts have not
200. Id. at 971.
201. See id. at 972.
202. See id. The response to Carrier's concern, may lie in this portion of the court's deci-
sion. See Carrier, supra note 42, at 70. The court's fear of censorship would not seem to apply
to traditional baseball card distributors. Therefore, in a case involving non-parodic baseball
cards, the court's balancing step analysis could swing in favor of the MLBPA.
203. See Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 972-73 (quoting Judge Kozinski's dissent in White v. Sam-
sung Elecs. Amer., Inc., 989 F.2d 1395, 1519 (9th Cir. 1992) ("The last thing we need, the last
thing the First Amendment will tolerate, is a law that lets public figures keep people from
mocking them.")
204. Carrier states:
The effect of the Tenth Circuit's decision on at least one segment of the trading card
market is clear: Cardtoons creates an exception in the right of publicity for trading card
parodists. One company began selling trading card parodies of National Basketball
Association players in 1994. The NBA did not fie an action against that company,
choosing to await the outcome of Cardtoons. Other sports cards' parodists will surely
join the market.
Carrier, supra note 42, at 169-70.
205. See id. at 170.
206. See id. (citing Michal E. Hartmann & Daniel R. Kelly, Parody (of Celebrities, in
Advertising), Parity (Between Advertising and Other Types of Commercial Speech), and (the
Property Side of) Publicity, 17 HAsTINGS Comm. & ETr. L.J. 633, 687 (1995)).
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yet developed a test that would balance rights of publicity against com-
mercial free speech. This is an issue that will surely arise again.
IV. FALSE START, NUMBER 79 OFFENSE, 5 YARD PENALTY, REPEAT
SECOND DOWN: REMIEDIES IN RIGHT OF PUBLICITY CASES
Plaintiffs, including professional athletes, who successfully bring a
right of publicity action are entitled to both injunctive relief and mone-
tary damages. 0 7 The monetary damages in a right of publicity action are
awarded for damage done to the commercial value of a proprietary right
of the plaintiff, as opposed to damages under misappropriation claims,
which are awarded for mental anguish. 0 Perhaps the easiest way to
conceptualize the difference between the two is that a violation of the
right of publicity implicates injury to the pocketbook whereas an inva-
sion of privacy focuses on the injury to the psyche.20 9
A. Injunctive Relief
Injunctive relief is the standard remedy for preventing continuous vi-
olations of the plaintiff's right of publicity.210 Professor McCarthy
writes:
It is difficult to envision a case where infringement of publicity
rights ... has been found where money damages are adequate to
compensate for the future and continuing unpermitted use of a
person's identity. If an injunction were denied, the court would
be telling plaintiff to sit by and watch defendant continue to in-
fringe upon plaintiff's rights until such time as plaintiff decided to
sue again for money damages as compensation.
Courts have often recognized that failure to grant an injunction in a right
of publicity case leaves the plaintiff with an inadequate result.212
Uhlaender v. Henrickson involved an action by several professional
baseball players, appearing through Ted Uhlaender and the Major
League Baseball Players Association, against the manufacturer of two
games that they claimed violated their right of publicity.213 The games
207. Alexander Margolies, Sports Figures' Right of Publicity, 1 SPORTS LAw. J. 359, 367
(1994).
208. See 2 J. THOMAS McCARTHY, THE RiGH-rs OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY, § 11.8, at
11-43 to 11-44 (Rev. 1999).
209. See id. § 11.8, at 11-44.
210. See Margolies, supra note 206, at 367; McCARTHY, supra note 207, § 11.6[A], at 11-
26.
211. McCARTHiy, supra note 207, § 11.6[A], at 11-26.
212. See id.
213. 316 F. Supp. 1277 (D. Minn. 1970).
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capitalized on the names and professional statistical information such as
batting, fielding, and earned run averages of over 500 major league base-
ball players. The players sought to enjoin the commercial use of the
games in question.214 The court observed:
It seems clear to the court that a celebrity's property interest in
his name and likeness is unique, and therefore there is no serious
question as to the propriety of injunctive relief. Defendants have
violated plaintiffs' rights by the unauthorized appropriation of
their names and statistics for commercial use. The remedy at law,
considering particularly the difficulty in determining and measur-
ing damages, past or future, is inadequate.21 5
The court granted the injunction.
One big advantage in granting an injunction in a right of publicity
case is "that it can be carefully tailored to preserve whatever rights de-
fendant possesses to proper use of plaintiff's identity." '16 This technique
could prove useful in a case in which the defendant has been assigned
some rights to use the plaintiff's persona in advertising, but has exceeded
the terms of the agreement, maybe even by mistake. 7 The injunction
could require the defendant to stay within the terms of the agreement
(thereby clearing up the nature of the assignment), but need not take
away all rights to use the name. Similarly, when issues of free speech are
involved, an injunction can effectively prohibit the illegal behavior while
affecting the free speech as little as possible, allowing courts to follow
the "least restrictive alternative" rule. 1 8
Preliminary injunctions are more difficult to get than are injunctions
against infringement. In deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunc-
tion, most courts will weigh the following five criteria:
1. Can plaintiff show a probability of success at the ultimate trial
on the merits?
2. Can plaintiff show that it will suffer "irreparable injury" pend-
ing a full trial on the merits?
3. Will a preliminary injunction preserve the "status quo" which
preceded the dispute?
4. Do the hardships balance in favor of plaintiff?
5. Is a preliminary injunction helpful to protect third parties?21 9
214. See id.
215. Id. at 1283.
216. McCA 1TrY, supra note 207, § 11.6[A], at 11-27.
217. See id
218. See iL
219. Id., § 11.6[B], at 11-28 to 11-29 (noting also that the Second and Ninth Circuits have
developed a more complex test for deciding when a preliminary injunction should be granted).
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In Ali v. Playgirl, Inc.,220 examined above for its discussion of "iden-
tifiability," the court also considered at length the concept of "irrepara-
ble injury" with regard to the use of a depiction of the famed boxer
without his consent:22'
As has been noted, in the course of his public career plaintiff has
established a commercially valuable proprietary interest in his
likeness and reputation, analogous to the good will accumulated
in the name of a successful business entity. To the extent that
defendants are unlawfully appropriating this valuable commodity
for themselves, proof of damages or unjust enrichment may be
extremely difficult.... [F]urthermore, defendants appear not only
to be usurping plaintiff's valuable right of publicity for themselves
but may well be inflicting damage upon this marketable reputa-
tion.... [T]he "likeness" of Ali which has been published is a full
frontal nude drawing, not merely a sketch or photograph of him
as he appears in public. Damages from such evident abuse of
plaintiff's property right in his public reputation are plainly diffi-
cult to measure by monetary standards. 2
The court concluded that the difficulty of establishing monetary damages
left Ali without an adequate remedy at law and sufficiently established
the requisite irreparable injury. Therefore, the court granted a prelimi-
nary injunction.
It is the rule in America that a court has the power to control the
actions of a person over whom it has personal jurisdiction, even if that
person ventures beyond the scope of the court's territorial jurisdic-
tion.2' Therefore, state courts can enjoin activities outside of their
state.224 However, courts do not always exercise this power, in part due
to the fear that the conduct in question is not illegal in other jurisdic-
tions.2' The Restatement takes the view that in right of publicity cases,
injunctions national in scope are preferred over those limited to one
state.226 The rationale is that a nationwide injunction keeps the court
from having to utilize scarce resources in determining which other juris-
dictions have the same right of publicity rules as the forum jurisdiction.
It is easier to put the burden on the defendant to demonstrate that the
220. 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
221. See McCARTHY, supra note 207, § 11.6[B], at 11-28.
222. Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 729 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
223. See McCARTHY, supra note 207, § 11.6[D], at 11-32.
224. See id.
225. See id.
226. See id., § 11.6[D], at 11-33.
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conduct the court has determined infringes upon the right of publicity in
one state does not violate the law of another state. 227
B. Compensatory Damages
Three types of damage awards exist for plaintiff's who bring success-
ful right of publicity cases. McCarthy characterizes them as: "fair market
value of identity," "damage to professional standing and publicity
value," and "unjust enrichment and infringer's profits."'2 All three
kinds of monetary damages have been awarded in right of publicity cases
involving professional athletes. Furthermore, because the fair market
value of identity method and the damage to professional standing meth-
ods address different injuries, the plaintiff may recover under both theo-
ries in one action. The unjust enrichment measure may be awarded in
conjunction with the other two to the extent that such award does not
result in double recovery.229
Furthermore, as pointed out in the Restatement of Unfair Competi-
tion, whether the defendant intended to violate the plaintiff's right of
publicity is more appropriately addressed at the damages stage of a
court's analysis, than at the liability stage. Therefore, a defendant can be
found liable to a plaintiff for violation of his right of publicity even
though the defendant did not intend to infringe upon that right. How-
ever, the defendant's lack of intent may be considered a mitigating factor
reducing the amount that the court awards in damages.
1. Fair Market Value of Identity
The first and most obvious potential measure of damages in a right of
publicity case is the "market value of the use of plaintiff's identity or
persona in the commercial setting in which defendant has used it."' 0
For celebrities, including professional athletes, market value can be de-
termined easily through expert testimony as to the kind of fees that simi-
227. See id. (citing Mansfield's dissent in Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 652 F.2d 278,
289-90 (2nd Cir. 1981); RESTATEMENT (TmmD) OF UNFAM CoMPE , ION § 48 cmt. c (1995)
("[A]lithough a court may have jurisdiction to grant broader relief, an injunction protecting
the right of publicity should ordinarily be limited to conduct in jurisdictions that provide pro-
tection comparable to the forum state. A procedure permitting the defendant to request a
modification of a geographically unlimited injunction upon a showing that the conduct is law-
ful under the law of another state can be an efficient method of resolving this issue.")
228. McCARY, supra note 207, § 11.8[B], at 11-45.
229. See iL § 11.8[D], at 11-51.
230. Id., § 11.8[B], at 11-45.
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larly situated individuals get for similar uses of their persona?231 This
method of determining has been used by courts in many cases.
Town & Country Properties, Inc. v. Riggins, a Virginia Supreme
Court case, involved this method of computing damages?3 2 John Rig-
gins, the former New York Jets and Washington Redskins Pro Football
Hall of Fame running back, sued his ex wife, a real estate agent who
worked for Town & Country Properties, under a statutory invasion of
privacy claim. The statutory right is violated "if a person's 'name, por-
trait, or picture' is used for 'advertising purposes or for the purposes of
trade' without written consent." 3 The claim is essentially a right of
publicity claim, though Virginia courts do not refer to it as such. Riggins
alleged that his ex wife had advertised a house as "John Riggins' former
home" on a flyer without his consent, in order to drum up interest in the
house and get a better sale price, thus violating his statutory right.3 4
The court first upheld the lower court's finding that Riggins' statutory
right had been violated, and then turned to the issue of damages,3 5
At trial, expert testimony had been given by Riggins' expert, Frederic
A. Fried, as to the amount of damages that the jury should award?3 6
The expert in question was the owner of a sports marketing company
that specialized in marketing and promoting athletes. The expert's cli-
ents had included, at one time or another: Boomer Esiason, who at the
time was quarterback of the New York Jets; Jim Kelly, then quarterback
of the Buffalo Bills; Troy Aikman, still quarterback of the Dallas Cow-
boys; and Michael Jordan, the recently retired Chicago Bull. Fried had
never represented Riggins. Fried's company handled all types of corpo-
rate sponsorship and marketing deals for players in all major sports.
Fried testified that in his expert opinion, Riggins was "a proven com-
modity," and that it would be common in the sports marketing business
for an ex-athlete with Riggins' credentials to charge a fifty thousand dol-
lar fee for lending his name to a flyer such as the one in question.3 7 The
jury awarded damages of twenty-five thousand dollars to Riggins. 23
Town & Country argued that the trial court "erred in admitting the opin-
ion of [Riggins'] expert because the opinion lacked an 'adequate founda-
231. See id.
232. 457 S.E.2d 356 (Va. 1995).
233. Id. at 361.
234. Id. at 362.
235. See id. at 363-365.
236. See id. at 364.
237. See Town & Country Properties, Inc. v. Riggins, 457 S.E.2d 356, 362 (Va. 1995).
238. See hi. at 361.
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tion' and because there was no 'causal connection' between the expert's
testimony and 'the pertinent issue."'"
The Virginia Supreme Court held that Town & Country's attack on
Fried's testimony as lacking any "causal connection" to the issues merely
went to the weight to be given to the expert's testimony, and not to its
admissibility.240 Furthermore, the court found that the jury's award of
twenty-five thousand dollars to Riggins was supported by the expert's
testimony, as well as by Riggins own estimation that he normally
charged endorsement fees ranging from twenty to ninety thousand dol-
lars.241 Therefore, the court found that there was "ample credible evi-
dence to support the jury's assessment of compensatory damages," and
upheld the lower courts decision to allow a sports marketing expert to
testify as to the fee amount that a plaintiff who is a former athlete would
normally charge for the use of his name.2 4z
It is very important that counsel for a professional athlete plaintiff
introduce evidence such as that introduced in the Riggins case when
claiming a violation of the athlete's right of publicity. "If plaintiff in-
troduces no evidence as to the commercial value of his or her identity,
the court has no choice but to award only 'nominal' damages."243
One other important note should be made here: it may be inherently
unfair to limit the plaintiffs monetary award to the fair market value of
the plaintiff's persona. If the court merely awards the fair market value
measure of damages, the defendant is no worse off than if it had ob-
tained a license from the plaintiff in the first place (except, of course, to
the extent of attorney's fees). This situation may not give the defendant
the proper incentive to get the plaintiffs consent in advance. Further-
more, the fair market measure of damages does not compensate the
plaintiff for the harm to him in not being able to control the way in
which his image or likeness is used. In order to prevent unjust enrich-
ment and insure adequate deterrence the Restatement of Unfair Compe-
tition advises courts to give the plaintiff the benefit of the doubt when
using this measure of damages.'" The Restatement appears to advocate
a sort of "tie goes to the runner" rule. In other words, when a court is
determining the proper measure of damages, it should resolve any
239. Id. at 364.
240. See id. at 364.
241. See id. at 364.
242. Town & Country Properties, Inc. v. Riggins, 457 S.E.2d 356, 364 (Va. 1995).
243. McCARTHY, supra note 207, § 11.8[B], at 11-49.
244. See id. § 11.8[C], at 11-50 to 11-51; RFSTATEmENT (TB=P) OF UNFAIR COPETITION
§ 49 cmt. d (1995).
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doubts it may have as to the proper award of "fair market value" in
favor of the plaintiff. Essentially, the Restatement is encouraging courts
to skew their figures slightly higher than the actual fair market value in
order to compensate for the built in injustices of the system.
2. Damage to Professional Standing and Publicity Value
This second measure of damages granted to successful plaintiffs in
right of publicity cases, damage to professional standing and publicity
value, is utilized when use of plaintiff's identity without his consent can
amount to more than just the fair market value of the particular use of
the identity.245 The reasoning behind this measure of damages is that
"[t]he timing or context of defendant's use may damage plaintiff's pro-
fessional standing and reasonable expectation of income, as well as the
future publicity value of the plaintiff's identity." '246 Examples of this
kind of damage occur when defendant's infringing use involves: endorse-
ment of a shoddy product, a product outside the scope of the plaintiff's
carefully developed image, goods that are similar to other goods plaintiff
endorses (causing dilution of value in actual endorsement), a plaintiff
that has never licensed his identity for like goods before (this may pre-
vent further licensing possibilities), overexposure of plaintiff's identity,
or a product that the public knows plaintiff does not use or support (de-
stroying plaintiff's credibility).247
In Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., mentioned earlier for its exam-
ination of the application of the right of publicity in situations involving
plaintiff nicknames, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin also briefly dis-
cussed this measure of damages.248 The court noted that investment of
work, time and money by an athlete all combine to build the publicity
value in the athlete's name.249 Therefore, the court found that an appro-
priate remedy for appropriation of a person's name for trade purposes
would take into account that the "economic damage caused by unau-
thorized commercial use of a name may take many forms, including
damage to reputation if the advertised product or service is shoddy and
the dilution of the value of the name in authorized advertising."' 0
245. See McCAiy, supra note 207, § 11.8[C, at 11-50.
246. Id.
247. See id.
248. See 280 N.W.2d 129 (Wis. 1979).
249. See id. at 134-135.
250. Id. at 138.
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3. Unjust Enrichment and Infringer's Profits
Recovery of profit made by defendant as the fruit of the infringing
use is a standard form of damages in trademark and copyright infringe-
ment cases, which are analogous to cases involving the right of public-
ity." 1 Therefore, there is a good argument that "the large body of case
law on recovery of profits in cases of infringement of copyrights and
trademarks should provide useful guidance in determining recovery of
profits in cases of infringement of the Right of Publicity.' ' 2 The Re-
statement (Third) of the Law of Unfair Competition takes the view that
this type of damages is an "ordinarily available" remedy in right of pub-
licity cases. 253 In addition, some state statutes explicitly provide for un-
just enrichment as an ordinary measure of damages in such cases.' 4
Not all courts, however, view the profits of the infringer as the proper
measure of damages in a right of publicity case. Some take the view that
the infringer's profits are merely one factor to look at in the determina-
tion of damages. Hogan v. A.S. Barnes & Co., Inc., decided in 1957,
involved golf legend Ben Hogan's right of publicity action against the
publisher (Barnes & Co.) of a book discussing the techniques of many
famous golfers around the world.255 The author of the book took pic-
tures of Hogan at Baltusrol and subsequently offered to pay Hogan one
hundred dollars if Hogan would allow him to use the pictures in his
book. Hogan responded to the author's request by writing him a note
that simply said, "Are you kidding?" Despite Hogan's flat denial of his
request, the author used the photographs in his book. 6 The book did
not make any money. The court held that the fact that the defendant's
book "proved to be unprofitable" did not limit Hogan to the recovery of
nominal damages.2 7 The court found that because Hogan was
claiming damages for injury to his own 'right of publicity.., the
question of whether the publication of the book resulted in profit
or loss to defendant is neither determinative of [Hogan's] right to
damages nor the extent thereof, although it may be one of the
factors to be considered in assessing the amount of damages.2s8
251. See McCAR=rH, supra note 207, § ll.8[D], at 11-51.
252. Id. § 11.8[D], at 11-51 to 11-52.
253. See hL at 11-52 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMP-"TION § 49 cmt. d
(1995)).
254. See McCARY, supra note 207, § 11.8[D], at 11-52 (citing TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-
25-1106(d); Wis. STAT. § 895.50(1)(b)).
255. 114 U.S.P.Q. 314 (Pa. 1957).
256. See id. at 315.
257. Id. at 321.
258. Id.
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C. Punitive Damages
In right of publicity cases, "[p]unitive damages are available accord-
ing to state law." 9 Courts have usually required proof of "premedi-
tated or knowing" use of plaintiff's identity by the defendant before an
award of punitive damages can be justified.2 60 Some courts have held
that willful behavior may not be enough to support punitive damages,
even where defendant blatantly disregards plaintiffs refusal to grant con-
sent, if a determination is made that defendant acted without the intent
to specifically exploit the plaintiff. In Hogan v. A.S. Barnes & Co., Inc.,
discussed in the previous section, Hogan argued that he should be
awarded punitive damages because, despite the fact that his response to
defendant's request to use pictures of Hogan in defendant's book was
"Are you kidding?" defendant used the pictures anyway.261 The court
refused to award punitive damages. First, the court noted that "an
award of punitive damages must be based on 'malicious, wanton, reck-
less, willful or oppressive conduct on the part of the defendant. ' 262 Then
the court stated that while defendant's conduct may have been willful
"in the sense that it made use of [Hogan's] name and photographs over
his express protest," the court found "no basis for holding that defend-
ant's conduct... was malicious, wanton, reckless or oppressive," since
the evidence showed that defendant never intended to specifically ex-
ploit Hogan in that Hogan's "name, skill and photographs were not sin-
gled out for prominent display in the defendant's publication. '263 The
court accordingly rejected Hogan's request for punitive damages.264
More recently, in 1991, punitive damages were awarded by a district
court in Pennsylvania based on willful disregard of the publicity rights of
former heavyweight champion of the world "Smokin"' Joe Frazier. Fra-
zier v. South Florida Cruises involved the promotion by defendant of a
cruise that would "attract customers interested in the sport of kings. '26 5
Potential customers were told that on this cruise, many former boxing
champions would be on hand to sign autographs and mingle with the
passengers. The defendant advertised that among those invited were
Frazier, Rocky "Dead End" Graziano, Jake "Bronx Bull" LaMotta, Car-
los Palamino, and Danny "Little Red" Lopez. What defendant failed to
259. Margolies, supra note 206, at 368.
260. McCARTY, supra note 207, § 11.9, at 11-57.
261. 114 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 314, 315 (Pa. 1957).
262. Id. at 322.
263. Id. at 322-323.
264. See id. at 321-323.
265. 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1470, 1471 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
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mention was that Frazier had already rejected the proposal, and had not
consented to the use of his name in connection with the cruise. In con-
sidering the issue of whether the jury's award of punitive damages at
trial was justified, the court observed that the defendant had "com-
menced its advertising campaign without any genuine belief that the
plaintiff had granted, or would grant, permission to use his name to pro-
mote the venture."266 The court held that this fact justified both the
jury's conclusion that the defendant acted with willful disregard for Fra-
zier's right of publicity and the jury's award of punitive damages. 67
V. EXTRA INNINGS: TIm PosTmoRTEM RIGHT OF PuBLIcITY
Traditional privacy rights protect "the dignitary, reputational, emo-
tional and physical rights of persons. 268 Privacy rights do not survive
the death of the individual whose privacy they are intended to protect,
since once the person is dead, his protection is no longer necessary. On
the other hand, property rights survive death, passing to heirs or assign-
ees.269 The right of publicity is once again haunted by the specter of the
right of privacy. Courts that view the right of publicity as a subset of the
right of privacy will not grant a postmortem right of publicity, while
courts that view the right of publicity as more akin to a property right
will recognize a postmortem right.
It appears that the "overwhelming majority rule under either statute
or common law is that the right of publicity is descendible property and
has an unconditional postmortem duration." 270 The reasons for recog-
nizing a post mortem right of publicity were laid out in Martin Luther
King, Jr., Center for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Products,
Inc., in which the heirs and assignees of Martin Luther King, Jr. alleged
that the defendant had infringed upon Dr. King's right of publicity by
selling plastic busts of Dr. King.271 The Eleventh Circuit, finding that
case law in Georgia was sparse regarding the right of publicity, certified
a number of questions to the Supreme Court of Georgia, including
266. Id. at 1472.
267. See id.
268. McCARTmY, supra note 9, § 28:42, at 28-54.
269. See id. § 28:43, , at 28-54 to 28-55.
270. Id. § 28:45, at 28-57 (calling Ohio "a lonely minority of one" among jurisdictions with
"a decision still outstanding and not overruled by statute which rejects the existence of a
common law postmortem right of publicity.") See Reeves v. United Artists, 572 F. Supp. 1231
(N.D. Ohio 1983) (holding that the right of publicity does not survive the death of the person
it protects.)
271. 694 F.2d 674 (11th Cir. 1983).
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whether the right of publicity survives the death of its owner.' The
Supreme Court of Georgia held that "the right of publicity survives the
death of its owner and is inheritable and devisable."273 In support of its
conclusion, the Court noted:
Recognition of the right of publicity rewards and thereby encour-
ages effort and creativity. If the right of publicity dies with the
celebrity, the economic value of the right of publicity during life
would be diminished because the celebrity's untimely death
would seriously impair, if not destroy, the value of the right of
continued commercial use. Conversely, those who would profit
from the fame of a celebrity after his or her death for their own
benefit have failed to establish their claim that they should be the
beneficiaries of the celebrity's death. Finally, the trend since the
early common law has been to recognize the survivability2 7 4
Based on reasons such as these, most courts which have visited the issue
have decided that the right of publicity does survive the death of its
owner.
Sixteen states have statutes which recognize the post mortem right of
publicity, either explicitly or implicitly through the right of privacy.275
The length of time that the right survives varies from ten years to one
hundred years to no stated duration.2 7 6 Five states which have statutes
that either explicitly or implicitly recognize the right of publicity do not
extend those rights beyond the death of their owner. Therefore, the ma-
jority rule among states with statutory rights of publicity is also that a
post mortem right of publicity does exist.
Some courts have attempted to form a compromise between the
competing views of the right of publicity, privacy versus property, by
holding that the right of publicity lasts after death only if the person who
holds the right exploited it during his lifetime. This position is referred to
as the "lifetime exploitation requirement,"277 and can be viewed as a
conditional post mortem right of publicity. The lifetime exploitation re-
quirement has increasingly come under attack by the commentators, and
has accordingly declined in importance. 8 Two indicators of the decline
in importance of the lifetime exploitation requirement are California
272. See id. at 674, 680.
273. Id at 682.
274. Id.
275. See McCrIY, supra note 51, § 6.3, at 6-13 to 6-14; McCARTHY, supra note 9,
§ 28:45, at 28-57.
276. See McCARIY, supra note 51, § 6.3, at 6-13 to 6-14.
277. McCARTHY, supra note 9., § 28:44, at 28-55.
278. See McCARTHY, supra note 207, § 9.3[B][2], at 9-22 to 9-24.
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Civil Code section 990 and an opinion by the Eleventh Circuit regarding
whether the right of publicity survives the death of the individual whose
rights it is designed to protect.279
In 1985, the California legislature enacted California Civil Code sec-
tion 990, which created a statutory postmortem right of publicity lasting
fifty years.280 California Civil Code § 990 rejects the lifetime exploita-
tion requirement. 281 The statute grants a post mortem right of publicity
"whether or not during the lifetime of that natural person the person
used his or her name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness on or in
products, merchandise or goods, or for purposes of advertising or selling,
or solicitation of purchase of, products, merchandise, goods or serv-
ices. ' 282 The statute makes clear that no lifetime exploitation by the in-
dividual is necessary to bring the post mortem right into effect.
In Martin Luther King, Jr., Center for Social Change, Inc. v. Ameri-
can Heritage Products, Inc., discussed earlier in this section, the Eleventh
Circuit certified the question to the Supreme Court of Georgia whether
commercial exploitation of the right of publicity during life is necessary
for the right of publicity to survive the death of its owner. 3 The
Supreme Court of Georgia held that commercial exploitation was not a
prerequisite to the postmortem right of publicity.8' The Court found:
That we should single out for protection after death those enter-
tainers and athletes who exploit their personae during life, and
deny protection after death to those who enjoy public acclama-
tion but did not exploit themselves during life, puts a premium on
exploitation. Having found that there are valid reasons for recog-
nizing the right of publicity during life, we find no reason to pro-
tect after death only those who took commercial advantage of
their fame... Dr. King could have exploited his name and like-
ness during his lifetime. That this opportunity was not appealing
to him does not mean that others have the right to use his name
and likeness in ways he himself chose not to do. Nor does it strip
his family and estate of the right to control, preserve and extend
his status and memory and to prevent unauthorized exploitation
279. See CAL. CIrv. CODE § 990 (West 1985); Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. For Soc.
Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Prod., Inc., 694 F.2d 674 (11th Cir. 1983).
280. CAL. CIV. CODE § 990 (West 1985).
281. See McCARTHY, supra note 9, § 28:42, at 28-56.
282. CAL. CIV. CODE § 990 (vest 1985).
283. See 694 F.2d 674 (11th Cir. 1983).
284. See id. at 683-684.
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of his likeness in a manner they consider unflattering and
unfitting. 85
It appears that only Utah still adheres to the lifetime exploitation
requirement.8 6
VI. CONCLUSION
Over the last fifty years, the right of publicity has been gaining in-
creasing momentum. Beginning with the Haelan decision in 1953 then
the Nimmer article in 1954 and finally the RESTATEMENT'S adoption of
the right in 1995, there appears to be a strong push for the recognition of
this right throughout the land. As of the this writing, fifteen states have
adopted statutory protection and seventeen states have adopted com-
mon law protection for the right of publicity. Because some of those
states have adopted both, the total number of states that have recog-
nized the right in one form or another is almost half of all of the United
States - twenty four to be exact, and one can expect that number to keep
growing.
285. Id. at 683.
286. See McCARmHY, supra note 9, § 28:45, at 28-57 (citing Nature's Way Prods. Inc. v.
Nature-Pharma, Inc., 736 F. Supp. 245 (D. Utah 1990) and noting that the court was under the
mistaken impression that the lifetime exploitation requirement was the rule in other states).
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